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ABSTRACT 
h Development of high technology and high cost weapons system is a difficult task in view of .  high 
reliability goals. It is further compounded in the case of single-shot airborne systems. Overall reliability 
of weapons system depends upon the reliability of systems and sub-systems used. Design of each system 
and sub-system is fmalised after preliminary design review, critical design review, etc. and final reliability 
is demonstrated by s u b e i n g  to functional tests. 
Warhead is the only sub-system responsible for inflicting damage to the target and all the otheremb- 
systems assist in delivering the warhead on or near the target. Safety actuating mechanism (SAM) sub- 
system is a single-shot device which provides safety during handling, launch and flight of a missile and actuates 
the warhead, whenever desired on receipt of firing pulse from radio altitude switch. SAM being critical for 
successful detonation of the warhead, it is desired that this unit should have very high reliability. SAM 
units are subjected to reliability tests and a reliability factor of 0.84 at 90 per cent confidence level is achieved 
which further increases to 0.98 due to redundancy. 
1. INTRODUCTION consistently good quality systems. Missile being a 
pEdictioR assessment and evaluation ofreliability weapon system, no user would like to use if it does 
must be based on relevant and credible data. not perform as expected. Under the circumstances, 
Unfortunately for most applications, collection of data Paramount need and conflicting demands of today are 
on reliability is expensive and time consuming. As a 011th product design like high reliability, less complexity 
result, many manufacturers simply design and build low-cosf, and easy to mainfain and use. 
their products, as best as they can, and hope for their Reliability has to be introduced right from the 
reliability in service. In some cases, cCHIcUrrent design sfage so that the end product is reliable. In 
engineering methods are product large weapons systems like missiles, the required 
and manufachlring processes with good quality 
reliability values are allocated to various sub-systems, 
and sometimes, reliability tests are conducted on the bwd on the system configuration. These allocated 
resulting products. 
, values becomi targets for sub-system designers. Based 
Aerospace technology applications, such as guided on the realised reliabilities of sub-systems, flight trials 
weapons, launch vehicles, etc. need highly reliable and with integration of various sub-systems can be carried 
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out. However, classical approach for reliability 
measurements require a relatively large number of tests 
for long periods to generate large amount of test data 
to produce estimates with reasonable confidence levels. 
Moreover, design and development cycle is shortening 
as the technology becomes obsolete very fast. Indeed, 
under the demands for time and cost-effectiveness 
Bayesian technique which takes into account both 
subjective test data (i.e. past experience, engineering 
judgement, reliability prediction etc.) and objective 
(actual) test data is one of the methods for estimating 
probability of success of a particular system, The data 
could be either attributive or continuous type. SAM 
being the most critical system for detonation of 
warhead and to achieve mission, it was decided to 
demonstrate reliability to the users by conducting 
functional tests using classical approach. 
2. CASE STUDY 
SAM is located at the base of a warhead which 
actuates the warhead on receipt of firing pulse form 
RAS. It provides the following safeties. 
2.1 Minimum Time Safety 
Minimum time safety is provided by clockwork 
mechanism. This isolates the circuit of the pyrotechnic 
device (the firing of which subsequently aligns detonator 
with main explosive train) on receiving the command. 
2.2 Igniter Shorting 
When the missile is at predetermined distance 
from the target, Command I1 generates a pulse which 
removes shorting of igniter by firing of a squib. The 
shorting of the igniter cannot be removed by spurious 
signals before the clockwork completes its set time. 
2.3 Detonator Mis-alignment 
The detonator is mis-aligned from the explosive 
train during a coarse of a missile flight. When the 
missile is at pre-determined distance from its target, 
Command 11 generates a pulse to fire the squib to align 
detonator with explosive train. 
2.4 Radio Altitude Switch-Power Supply 
Power supply to RAS is made available only 
after removal of the above safeties and on receipt of 
Command 111, hence effective only after this stage. 
A single-shot device, i.e. SAM under development 
is considered for reliability demonstration. Assuming 
the test data follaws binomial distribution, reliability is 
estimated as the proportion of success to the total trials 
conducted. Upper and lower limit of reliability for 
a given confidence is estimated by the following 
equation: 
where 
p = Point reliability 
q = Failure probability 
n =No. of units tested 
Confidence intervals are obtained with assumption 
of normality which is not valid for small sample sizes. 
In case of small samples, exact method of estimation 
of lower and upper confidence bound of the limit is 
obtained by 
Confidence value = 1-RL-(n) (I-R,) --- (n) RL (1-RL)"f 
l-Confidence value = 1-R,-(n)R, (1-R,) --- (n) R, 
3. DESIGN QUALIFICATION & LOT 
ACCEPTANCE 
SAM design was qualified by subjecting sample 
units to qualification level tests for detonation proof. 
Sealing proof test was also carried out after subjecting 
the sample unit to all qualification level tests. 
Subsequently, production lots were accepted by 
subjecting the sample units for acceptance and functional 
level tests. Samples were picked up randomly from 
accepted lot for reliability demonstration. 
4. RELIABILITY TARGET 
Reliability target for SAM is 0.95 with 
90 per cent confidence level in dual SAM mode. 
Towards achieving this, it is required to test 45 dual 
SAM with zero failure. 
4.1 Reliability Test 
Figures 1 and 2 show functional and reliability block 
diagrams respectively. Various blocks in the diagram are 
independently testable for their performance. However, 
hot tests using squibs are not conducted in all cases. Only 
a few of them are hot tested for evaluation of the design 
of that particular sub-systems. The details of sub-system 
tests are given in Tables 1 and 2, wherein sub-system 
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Figure 1. Functional block diagram of  safety and arming mechanism 
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Figure 2. Reliability (mission) block diagram for SAM 
5. RELIABILITY TEST ON FULLSCaE SAM lot was accepted as per laid down acceptance test plan 
IN DUAL MODE which involved proof tests on seven units. Units for 
reliability demonstration were picked up at random fiom 
Ordnancef?ctor3'9 AmbhaJariassembled240units each accepted lot as per details given in Table 3 and 
of SAMpertainingtofivedifferentlotsandthesewere filled subjectedto functional test Ihclual mode. Individual units 
at ordnance factory, Chanda.Sub-assemblies/components were also monitored for their performance. Two squibs 
manufactured by VXL Ltd., Faridabad,were Inspected by used in the SAM are of the same specifications. The test 
local Inspection authority designated by Missile System data of squibs is presented in Table 2. 
Quality Assurance Agency (MSQAA), Hyderabad. Each 
Table 1. fhb-system test data 
3 r 
-- - 
Sub-system Project I Project I1 WY Full-SAM Failures RL at 90 % 
sub-system confidence level 
Launch 90 50 
dentent 
Rotary 90 50 
arming 
Explosives - 
chain 
Impact 90 
switch 
PCB - 
(Electronics) 
km, and km, - 
contact 
* PCB broken due to pyro shock 
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Table 2. Squib test data 
Lot Tested Failed Point Reliability at Remarks 
six. 90 % confidence 
level 
At HEMRL, Pune 
At OF, Chanda after 1 and 112 years 
63 0 At HE= after 2 years 
200 60 0 At HEMRL, Pune 
48 1 PCB damage due to excessive 
pressure generated in one of the 
SAM firings 
Others 123 0 At ARDE, Pune 
For the success of SAM, two squibs have to work. 
112 = 0.9859' 
Overall reliability of unit at 90 per cent confidence level = 0.8580. 
Table 3. Full-scale SAM test data 
Lot Lot Lot proof Reliability tests Remarks 
No. size (single SAM) (dual SAM) 
Unit Results Unit Results 
1 37 7 All functioned 10 All functionedin Squib B ckt did not close 
dual mode, One 
SAM failed in 
one of the pairs 
4 57 7 Allfunctioned 10 
All fbaioned in 
dual mode. Two 
SAMs failed, one 
fromeachpak 
All functioned in 
dual mode. However, 
two SAMs failed, one 
h m  each pair 
8 functioned 
2 pairs failed 
Squib B ckt failed to close 
(a) Squib B ckt S l e d  to c l d  
@) Soldered connection &om igniter 
pole to PCB diinnected 
(a) Rotor did not arm in one 
arm in one case and rotor armed 
but SAM not fired in other pair 1 
(b) Squib B ckt did not close 
in both SAMS. @air 2) 
4 All functioned. One Squib B ckt did not close 
SAM in one of the 
pairs failed 
5 32 7 6 functioned - - Squib B ckt did not close 
one failed 
DEF SCI J, VOL 49, NO 4, AUGUST 1999 
6. ANALYSIS OF TEST DATA 90 per cent confidence level 
The reliability tests were carried out in batches. 
Resultant data was analysed for mission reliability 
estimate. Even though, SAMs were tested in dual 
configuration, results were analysed as single SAM 
units for two reasons. Firstly, the status and end results 
of ignition were monitored separately and hence, the 
experiment could be treated as if two independent tests 
were conducted. Secondly, confidence on reliability 
estimates improved as the sample size increased. After 
obtaining the reliability estimate of single SAM, dual 
SAM configuration reliability was worked out. 
Test results of full-scale SAM pertaining to all 
lots were pooled to get the reliability of the system. 
Nine failures observed in closing circuit of squib B 
and one failure observed in rotor arming units were 
considered as independent tests. However, mission 
failure was observed in two tests. Reliability estimate 
based on the above data, is reported as 
Reliability of two parallel SAMs will be 
R = 1 - (I-R )2 
L 
Case I: Mission reliability (dual mode) 
Units tested = 44 
Units failed = 02 
Units Succeed = 42 
Points Reliability = 0.9545 
Lower limit of Reliability at 
90 per cent confidence level = 0.9144 
Case II: Unit reliability (single unit) 
Units tested = 88 
Units failed = 10 
Units succeed = 78 
Points reliability = 0.8864 
Lower limit of reliability at = 0.8431 
Reliability in dual mode = 0.9753 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on sub-system reliability estimate reliability 
of SAM unit was 0.8580 
Point reliability of unit was 0.8864 and lower level 
of unit reliability was 0.8431 at 90 per cent 
confidence level. However, the reliability of SAM 
was increased to 0.9753 by redundancy (i.e., by 
using two parallel SAMs) 
Point mission reliability in dual mode was 0.9545 
and lower level of reliability was 0.9144 at 90 per 
cent confidence level. This being lesser than the 
desired reliability, it was therefore suggested to 
review the design and improve the quality and 
reliability by design improvement. 
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